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Cleveland’s employment growth has
lagged the nation’s for nearly 15
years, a fact that is often blamed on
the kinds of industries that are
here—either the area is burdened
with too much manufacturing, or it
has failed to attract enough high-tech
industries. But an analysis shows 
little support for that view. 
Concerns about Cleveland’s economy
are nothing new. While Cleveland was
once one of America’s leading commer-
cial centers, it has not managed to main-
tain its economic importance through
the years. When the turning point came
is difficult to determine, though some
suggest that it happened as long ago as
1930. Along the way, Clevelanders have
been engaged in a long line of economic
revitalization efforts. One such effort
came early in the 1980s and was a
response to the tumultuous ‘60s and
‘70s, when events from the fire on the
Cuyahoga River to the city’s financial
crisis caused local leaders to search for
solutions anew. 
At that time, a group of concerned citi-
zens turned to the Rand Corporation to
determine the underlying causes of
Cleveland’s economic malaise. The
Rand Corporation concluded that: 
“Three broad trends characterize eco-
nomic conditions in the Cleveland area
over the past two decades …The total
population of the metropolitan area has
been declining. Total employment has
increased annually but at a much slower
rate than the nationwide average.
Employment in manufacturing indus-
tries has decreased, and employment in
nonmanufacturing industries has
increased.” 
This description suggests a slower-grow-
ing metropolitan area, which was losing
population for the first time. It also indi-
cates the shift toward service-sector
industries that was taking place in Cleve-
land, as well as throughout the nation
more generally. Many saw these two
developments as interrelated. The ques-
tion was what to do in response. While
some sought to hasten this transition
toward the service-sector—arguing that
the area’s ties to manufacturing were
weakening it economically—others
thought that Cleveland should try to retain
its importance as a manufacturing center. 
How much have things changed since this
report was written? Despite the positive
attention that Cleveland garnered as a
“comeback city” in the 1990s, not much.
The three broad trends that the Rand 
Corporation used to characterize the 
20-year period prior to 1980 look like a
reasonably good description of the 
20 years that followed. And just as before,
many think that Cleveland’s industrial
structure is at the root of the region’s
recent lackluster economic performance.
Some think that Cleveland has too much
manufacturing employment as a share of
its overall employment base, while others
think the area has failed to attract the right
industries—the technology-centered
industries in either the manufacturing or
service sectors that some see as the indus-
tries of the future.
But this Economic Commentary sug-
gests that Cleveland’s industrial structure
has had little to do with the area’s slug-
gish employment growth, at least during
the last decade and a half. We must look
to other factors—lifestyle amenities,
access to capital, tax policies, the avail-
ability of qualified workers, and so on—
for possible explanations. 
■ Cleveland Fares Worse than
the Nation
Figures 1 and 2 show cumulative private
sector employment growth in the Cleve-
land metropolitan area and the United
States from 1990 to 2003. Each bar
breaks down the extent to which various
sectors added to (those above zero) or
subtracted from (those below zero) the
cumulative employment increase in a
given year, and the blue lines show the
total cumulative change. What is readily
apparent in figures 1 and 2 is that
employment grew much more slowly in
the Cleveland area than in the nation dur-
ing this period. While national employ-
ment rose roughly 19 percent, employ-
ment gains in the Cleveland area were a
mere 3 percent.
What is also apparent from the figures is
that the manufacturing sector consis-
tently subtracted from job gains in both
Cleveland and across the nation through-
out the 1990s and since. And because
Cleveland has historically been a more
manufacturing-intensive place than
some other parts of the country, the
assertion that the region’s industrial
structure is responsible for the employ-
ment lag seems reasonable. Throughout
the period shown in figures 1 and 2,
Cleveland’s share of private employment
in the manufacturing sector was between
3.5 to 5 percentage points higher than in
the nation. Nevertheless, as we will see,
this difference alone cannot account for
the fact that the slice manufacturing took
out of Cleveland’s employment growth
was more than twice as big as the one ittook out of the nation’s (–7.2 versus –3.5
percentage points).  
But what is perhaps more striking in fig-
ures 1 and 2 is the difference outside of
the manufacturing sector. While sectors
outside of manufacturing generally
gained employment both regionally and
nationally over the period shown, growth
was far weaker in the Cleveland area
than in the nation. Collectively, nonman-
ufacturing sectors contributed about 10
percentage points to employment growth
in Cleveland. This was about half as
much as they contributed to national
employment over the same span of time. 
What could explain this dramatic diver-
gence in outcomes? There are essentially
two possibilities: The area had more
industries in decline than the nation—an
argument implicating Cleveland’s indus-
trial structure—or many of the area’s
industries simply performed more poorly
in terms of employment growth than
their national counterparts. In all likeli-
hood, some combination of these two
things occurred but which factor was
more dominant? 
■ Too Much Manufacturing?
Would the Cleveland area have added
more jobs over this period if it had fewer
manufacturers and more service-sector
industries? We can start to answer that
question with a simple experiment. First
we calculate how much Cleveland’s
employment would have grown if its
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing
sectors had grown at the same rates as
they did nationally, and then we com-
pare the resulting hypothetical employ-
ment number to the actual change. If the
hypothetical and actual numbers are
close, then the source of the difference
between Cleveland’s and the nation’s
employment growth was mostly some-
thing other than differences in sector
performance. It would have to have been
Cleveland’s industrial composition that
caused the difference.
But the results of this experiment show
that Cleveland’s industrial composition,
and in particular its above-average pro-
portion of manufacturing employment—
which was about 25 percent of private
employment in 1990, versus about 
20 percent nationally—was not the 
problem (see figure 3). From 1990 to
2003, Cleveland’s employment would
have risen roughly 17 percent if its manu-
facturing and nonmanufacturing employ-
ment had grown at the same rates as the
nation’s (roughly –18 percent and 28 per-
cent, respectively). This hypothetical
increase in employment for Cleveland
turns out to be similar to the actual growth
in national employment over this period,
nearly 19 percent. 
But the actual change in Cleveland’s
employment was 3.2 percent—less than
one-fifth of what was generated in the
exercise. In the experiment, manufactur-
ing deducts 4.4 percentage points from
Cleveland’s employment growth over
the period, while in actuality, it took
away 7.2 percentage points. Nonmanu-
facturing industries, had they grown in 
Cleveland at the rate they did nation-
wide, would have added 21.3 percentage
points to Cleveland’s employment
growth, but in reality, they added only
10.4 percentage points. 
If industrial structure had been the cul-
prit behind Cleveland’s comparatively
weak employment growth, our experi-
ment would have generated results that
looked like what actually occurred in
Cleveland. In fact, the opposite pattern
arises, suggesting that industrial struc-
ture, as conceived of broadly in this
exercise, explains very little of Cleve-
land’s poorer employment performance.
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a. Private-sector employment.■ The Wrong Types of
Industries?
Would Cleveland have added more jobs
if it had attracted more New-Economy,
high-technology industries in either the
manufacturing or service sectors? Could
Cleveland’s modest employment growth
stem from the fact that too many of its
manufacturing industries—such as steel
or autos—are in decline, rather than from
the size of its manufacturing sector? 
We can conduct an experiment similar
to the previous one to assess whether
this explanation fits the facts. Again, we
calculate how employment in Cleveland
would have changed if local industry
groups had grown at the rates they did
nationally. This time, however, we sepa-
rate private sector employment into
more than just manufacturing and non-
manufacturing. Instead, we examine the
employment patterns of industries at the
more detailed three-digit level of the
North American Industrial Classification
System (NAICS). At this level of detail,
we can focus more precisely on the types
of industries that are in Cleveland and
see whether Cleveland had enough of the
“right” industries in place. The data are
divided into 80 industries, 21 of which
are a part of the manufacturing sector,
and 59 of which are outside of the manu-
facturing sector. Rather than examining
each of the 80 industries in turn, we will
examine the combined contribution of
industries in the manufacturing sector
and the combined contribution of indus-
tries in nonmanufacturing sectors.
Grouping the individual industries back
into these two categories makes it easy to
compare the results of this experiment
with the first one. Remember, though,
that these manufacturing and nonmanu-
facturing groups are different from those
of the first experiment in that the particu-
lar industries each major group contains
more closely match those that are found
in the Cleveland area.
The results of this experiment suggest
that Cleveland didn’t have the “wrong”
kinds of industries either. As before, the
hypothetical employment measure 
created for Cleveland shows only slightly
less employment growth than what took
place nationally—an increase of 18 per-
cent relative to roughly 19 percent for 
the nation.  
Indeed, this more detailed accounting of
Cleveland’s industrial composition actu-
ally improves the experiment’s esti-
mated increase in employment com-
pared to the initial exercise, both in and
out of the manufacturing sector. This
reveals, contrary to conventional wis-
dom, that the mix of industries in Cleve-
land within the two broader aggregates
of manufacturing and nonmanufacturing
















actually performed better than their
national averages between 1990 and
2003. Manufacturing industries would
hypothetically have contributed a loss of
only 4.0 percentage points to the total
change in employment, instead of the
4.4 percentage-point loss produced in
the initial exercise. And nonmanufactur-
ing industries would have generated a
gain of 22.0 percentage points, rather
than the 21.3 percentage-point gain 
produced using the less representative
measure of the industries in Cleveland.
Of course, these differences are modest
relative to the gap between the scenarios
and the actual change in employment
that occurred over this period. 
In addition, something striking is
revealed when the second scenario is
repeated for the time from 1990 to 
2000: Cleveland’s mix of manufacturers
actually contributes no losses to total
employment, unlike what occurs 
nationally. This suggests that Cleve-
land’s portfolio of industries in the 
manufacturing sector was superior to 
the nation’s in the 1990s. These results
run completely counter to the notion 
that Cleveland has been beset by a host
of declining industries and unable to


















b. Scenarios include only industry groups (defined as three-digit NAICS
industries) common to Cleveland and the U.S.
SOURCE: Economy.com.
a. Private-sector employment.
b. Scenarios include only industry groups (defined as three-digit NAICS
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■ What Else Could It Be?
So what can explain the dramatic diver-
gence in employment growth between
Cleveland and the nation from 1990 to
2003? We have considered industrial
composition and found that it does not
explain Cleveland’s comparatively weak
employment performance. Neither the
region’s particular industrial mix nor the
overrepresentation of some sectors
seems to be responsible. 
What remains as an explanation is that
many of the area’s industries simply 
performed more poorly in terms of
employment growth than their national
counterparts. In fact, from 1990 to 2003
this was true for 67 of the 80 narrow
industries examined. Such a widespread
effect suggests either that several different
factors were at play in different industries
or that the factors causing the weakness
were of the sort that could affect an array
of industries in the region. Not only man-
ufacturing industries were affected, so, 
too, were service-sector firms. Not only
automakers and steel producers, but 
medical care and educational service
providers did not do as well as elsewhere
in the nation. What factors could affect 
so many different kinds of industries?
Among the possibilities are a lack of
qualified workers, the quality of life,
access to transportation or distribution
networks, or regional regulation and
tax policies. 
Observers who focus on an overabun-
dance of manufacturing as the explana-
tion for the region’s recent underperfor-
mance or on attracting the “right” 
mix of industries or the next new 
high-growth cluster that will remake 
the region seem to be missing a more 
fundamental problem, one that affects
almost all of the area’s industries. The
breadth of this underperformance is
striking and may suggest that some 
element of the region, or a combination
of factors, has made the region a less
favorable place for firms or individuals.
Clearly, there are many factors that
could come into play. This simple
analysis indicates that Cleveland’s
industrial structure, despite frequent
assertions to the contrary, is not one of
them, and does not appear to explain
the region’s recent employment experi-
ence. Accordingly, we would be well-
advised to look for answers elsewhere.